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Abstract 
This paper provides further empirical evidence of payment uncertainty in dichotomous choice 
contingent valuation (CV) and proposes an alternative way of certainty calibration, moving away from 
conventional recoding of uncertain responses. In an international CV application, the main sources of 
payment uncertainty are identified related to imperfect knowledge and information about the public 
environmental good involved, future supply levels, income constraints, price levels and the survey 
instrument. Together these sources of uncertainty are responsible for a third of the error variance in the 
estimated discrete choice model. Accounting for the heterogeneity induced by payment uncertainty in 
the welfare estimation procedure with the help of a mixed probit model yields a significantly lower 
welfare measure albeit at the expense of estimation precision. 
 
Running title: Payment certainty calibration in discrete choice welfare estimation  
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1. Introduction 
Stated preference methods such as contingent valuation (CV) face a number of biases, of 
which payment certainty related to the method’s hypothetical bias received a lot of attention 
after publication of the NOAA Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations (Arrow et al., 1993). 
Payment certainty refers to the empirical finding that respondents are unsure about their value 
statement for hypothetical changes in the provision level of a private or public good  (e.g. Li 
and Mattson, 1995; Ready et al., 1995; Champ et al., 1997). Values are systematically 
overstated when elicited under hypothetical conditions compared to real purchase decisions, 
as also shown in previous work published in this journal based on private (Johannesson et al., 
1998) and public goods (Veisten and Navrud, 2006). The extent to which hypothetical 
responses are overstated is influenced by the value elicitation method, including whether 
respondents were asked for their willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA), 
and whether the good concerns a private or public good (List and Gallet, 2001).  
 
To account for this overstatement, a number of calibration approaches have been advocated in 
the literature (e.g. Vossler et al., 2003). The most important ones are ex post decision ratings 
and the use of polychotomous elicitation formats. In the former case, the respondent is asked 
in a follow-up question to indicate the certainty of his WTP reply on a scale from 1 to 10 or 0 
to 100 percent. In the latter case, respondents are able to express their certainty through the 
dichotomous choice (DC) WTP question self, for example by answering ‘definitely yes, 
probably yes, don’t know/not sure, probably, definitely no’ to the presented bid amount. 
Typically, asymmetric approaches are applied based on self-reported payment certainty, 
where uncertain yes responses to a DC WTP question are recoded as certain no responses. 
This automatically reduces estimated mean WTP. In the limited number of studies exploring 
at which certainty cut-off value hypothetical WTP best simulates actual market behavior (i.e. 
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where uncertain yes responses are recoded to certain no responses), values vary between 6 
and 10 using a scale from 1 to 10 (e.g. Champ and Bishop, 2001; Poe et al., 2002). 
Polychotomous elicitation formats have been used to identify similar threshold values with 
the help of multinomial choice models where respondents switch between certain and 
uncertain WTP replies (e.g. Wang, 1997; Welsh and Poe, 1998; Alberini et al., 2003). In other 
applications, polychotomous elicitation formats were used as a WTP follow-up question and 
only the ‘definitely’ or ‘absolutely’ yes responses appeared to match actual purchase behavior 
for private goods (e.g. Johannesson et al., 1998; Blumenschein et al., 2008). Detailed reviews 
of the effect of payment certainty calibration approaches on stated WTP are presented in 
Samnaliev et al. (2006), Chang et al. (2007) and Shaikh et al. (2007).  
 
Although there exists no consensus in the literature about the most appropriate payment 
certainty elicitation format, the available empirical evidence listed above suggests that both 
approaches can help to reduce hypothetical bias in stated preference research. However, the 
evidence is limited and a fair share of the studies focus on private market goods. More 
research is needed in the area of public good valuation, also regarding underlying sources of 
payment uncertainty, which are rarely investigated (Alberini et al., 2003), but expected to 
provide important insight into the design of more reliable stated preference survey formats 
and WTP values. This paper further investigates the issue of payment certainty in an 
international CV application to value a public environmental good. The study’s main 
objective is to test the effect of an alternative certainty calibration method, moving away from 
existing recoding procedures and taking full account of the self-reported measurement error 
caused by payment uncertainty in the stochastic error component of a mixed probit discrete 
choice model. The purpose of this study is not to address appropriate payment certainty 
measurement methods, but rather assess what drives and explains payment certainty, use the 
Page 3 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 4 
available information in an integrated way in the choice model’s error variance to calibrate 
stated preferences, and compare the results with the conventional calibration approach.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
existing literature on explaining payment certainty. This is followed in section 3 by a 
description of the case study presented in this paper. The WTP results and self-reported 
payment certainty are presented in section 4, the estimated regression models in section 5 and 
the results of alternative certainty calibration methods on welfare estimation in section 6. 
Underlying reasons for the observed variation in stated payment certainty and the results of 
the estimated econometric model explaining payment certainty are discussed in section 7. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Explaining payment certainty 
The empirical evidence in the CV literature over the past fifteen years suggests that 
respondents are uncertain about their stated preferences for changes in the level of public 
environmental good provision. Although there exists no single unifying theoretical model that 
explains why people know their preferences with certainty (or not), familiarity and experience 
with (public environmental) goods and their valuation are generally assumed to be important 
determinants of preference stability and certainty. Hoeffler and Ariely (1999) show that 
preference stability is positively correlated with choice experience and choice effort (easy 
versus hard choice). In the latter case, a higher level of effort leads to more stable preferences, 
but less preference strength, meaning that respondents facing a hard choice are less certain of 
their preferences than respondents facing an easy choice. Through repetition respondents are 
expected to be capable of making more precise and consistent decisions, because they learn 
about the survey format, associated (hypothetical) market environment and their preferences 
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(List 2003)1. Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior (Ajzen et al., 2004) has also been suggested 
as an important starting point to better understand payment certainty. The stronger the 
behavioral intent (measured through greater certainty underlying stated WTP), the stronger 
the link to actual behavior (Blumenschein et al., 2008).  
 
The important role of a respondent’s prior knowledge of the good in question to reduce 
payment uncertainty is evidenced in Loomis and Ekstrand (1998). Respondent familiarity 
with the environmental good is the only significant explanatory factor together with bid price. 
In a mail survey, US households were asked for a voluntary contribution in terms of WTP for 
preserving the Mexican Spotted Owl and its habitat. Following a DC WTP question, a post-
decision certainty scale from 1 (not certain) to 10 (very certain) was used to elicit the level of 
response uncertainty. An OLS regression model on the pooled data (both yes and no 
responses) was applied to determine the sources of variations in the self-reported certainty 
scores. The other (non-significant) explanatory factor included in the model was a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent had ever visited the area proposed for protection. 
A significant quadratic effect of bid price was found, implying that self-reported payment 
certainty is highest around the lowest and highest bids, and lowest for intermediate bid levels 
closest to expected maximum WTP.  
 
Champ and Bishop (2001) examined US household preferences for a voluntary wind energy 
program from a local private electricity provider in another mail survey in Madison, 
Wisconsin. A split sample approach was used to identify possible differences in household 
behavior under a hypothetical and actual payment scenario. The same scale was applied as in 
                                                 
1
 In turn, the more uncertainty in someone’s preferences, the more expressed preferences will be subject to 
procedural and descriptive influences (e.g. Schkade and Payne 1994; Ariely et al., 2003). 
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Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) to measure the level of certainty for the group of respondents 
who were asked to pay for wind generated electricity under the hypothetical scenario. In an 
ordered probit model, respondent attitude to the proposed program was responsible for a large 
part of the observed variation in the self-reported certainty scores. Respondents in favour of 
the program and willing to pay the extra cost expressed higher certainty levels. No other 
significant explanatory factors were detected. 
 
Similar results were found in a mail survey in New Hampshire and Idaho where US 
households were asked to pay a user fee to access public land (Samnaliev et al., 2005). An ex 
post rating scale and polychotomous certainty choice format were used in two different 
samples. Responses to the former follow-up certainty question were regressed on possible 
explanatory factors. Two separate logistic regression models for the yes and no responses 
were estimated, where the dependent variable took the value 1 if the certainty score equalled 
10 (very certain). Respondents who objected against the imposed user fees (usually referred to 
as protest response in CV) were more certain in rejecting the bid price than others, reflecting 
(as argued by the authors) respondent general attitude towards the hypothetical market and the 
environmental protection program being valued.  
 
Finally, empirical evidence supporting the relationship between respondent attitude towards a 
public environmental good and payment certainty levels is also found in Akter et al. (2009), 
who asked international air travelers at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, the Netherlands to pay 
a carbon travel tax to offset carbon emissions from flying. When changing the market 
compliance imperative from a mandatory carbon tax to a voluntary contribution, a third of all 
air travelers considered it unlikely they would actually pay the price they said they would pay. 
In an ordered probit model, bid price, respondent sense of responsibility and belief in the 
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effectiveness of the voluntary carbon market were found to be the main determinants of self-
reported payment certainty. The higher the bid price, the less likely someone would actually 
pay, while a respondent’s sense of responsibility for contributing to climate change and 
respondent belief in the proposed tree plantation program to mitigate climate change resulted 
in a higher likelihood of paying.  
 
3. Case study design 
The data used in this paper are taken from an international water quality CV study conducted 
in the Scheldt river basin. The Scheldt is 350 km long and flows through three countries. The 
river originates in France, runs through Belgium and ends in the Netherlands where it flows 
into the North Sea. The international river basin covers an area of over 36 thousand square 
kilometres and has almost 13 million inhabitants. This corresponds with an average 
population density of 350 inhabitants per square km, which is almost three times the 
European average. The Scheldt is one of the pilot river basins in the implementation of the 
European Water Framework Directive (WFD) adopted in 2000, aiming to improve water 
quality of all European freshwaters to ‘good ecological status’ by 2015. Current Scheldt water 
quality does not meet this objective and was classified as ‘moderate to poor’ in the first WFD 
regulatory assessment report (Scaldit, 2006). In order to elicit public preferences for water 
quality improvement and obtain measures of WTP for the WFD water quality objectives, a 
CV questionnaire was sent out in October 2005 to a random selection of 17,000 households 
across the Scheldt basin. In particular, questionnaires were sent to 5,000 households in Artois-
Picardie in northern France, 9,000 in Flandres, Belgium, and 3,000 households in the Dutch 
part of the basin.  
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The common survey design was developed together with water experts from the responsible 
water management authorities and was pre-tested in French, Flemish and Dutch. The 
questions are identical in the three versions of the questionnaire except for the description of 
the current situation, which was modified to the specific prevailing circumstances and 
conditions in the three different parts of the river basin. A map and common water quality 
ladder were used to depict the current situation and show respondents the location and quality 
levels of the river relative to their place of residence.  
 
The questionnaire consists of four parts. In the first part, respondents are asked about their 
water related recreation activities, followed by a series of questions about their perception of 
current water quality and the importance they attach to water quality. Following these 
introductory questions, respondents are presented with a one-page information statement in 
the second part of the questionnaire, in which the actual water quality situation is described 
with the help of a map and a brief explanation of the WFD. After the information statement, 
respondents are asked how familiar they are with the presented information and how 
important it is to them that the WFD objective of ‘good ecological status’ is reached. This is 
then followed by a DC WTP question using 10 different bid amounts ranging between 5 and 
250 Euros and a post-decisional payment certainty question on a scale from 0-100% with 10 
percent intervals. It is explained that 0 means not certain at all and 100 means completely 
certain. An open-ended follow-up question is used to enable those respondents who are not 
completely certain to specify why not. The WTP question and the follow-up payment 
certainty questions are reproduced in Annex 1 of this paper. The third part of the 
questionnaire consists of a series of questions about the respondent’s demographic and socio-
economic household characteristics to test the survey’s representativeness. The fourth and 
final part concludes with a number of questions about the questionnaire self and in particular 
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the WTP question to examine respondent understanding of the WTP question, the perceived 
credibility of the valuation scenario and the difficulty experienced in answering the WTP 
question.  
 
The overall response rate was 18 percent, which is not unusual for these kinds of surveys in 
the three countries where the survey was conducted. As expected (based on available country 
specific demographic and socio-economic statistics), respondents differ significantly between 
countries except for age. Although the response rate was not very high, the three samples 
approximately represent the average inhabitant of the three countries. 
 
4. Hypothetical WTP and payment certainty 
Respondents were asked for their WTP through extra annual taxes until and including 2015 to 
reach a good ecological status for all water bodies in their part of the Scheldt basin. Just over 
half of all respondents (52%) said they were willing to pay extra for this purpose, and this 
share is more or less the same across the three river basin countries. Most of the respondents 
who were not willing to pay extra for the proposed water quality improvements motivated this 
by saying they lacked sufficient income (15%), ‘the polluter should pay’ (7%), ‘I already pay 
(enough) taxes for water quality’ (7%), and ‘there are more important other things I prefer to 
spend my money on’ (5%). About five percent believe that current water quality is good 
enough or consider water quality improvements not important enough to pay for. The share of 
respondents protesting against the WTP question in this study based on considerations such as 
the polluter should pay, lack of trust in the feasibility of the proposed program of measures or 
the responsible authorities is 9.5 percent of the total sample2. Protest rates vary slightly across 
                                                 
2
 Protest bidders typically object against the imposed market structure in a CV study (e.g. Meyerhoff and Liebe, 
2006). A separate analysis was carried out using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test to test differences 
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the three countries, from 7 percent in Belgium to 11 percent in the Netherlands and 13 percent 
in France.  
 
The probability distribution function of the positive responses to the DC WTP question is 
presented in Figure 1. As expected, the higher the bid amount, the lower the probability that 
the respondent is willing to pay. The certainty experienced when answering the DC WTP 
question is also presented in Figure 1. A distinction is made between yes and no votes. A 
small, but significant negative correlation exists between bid price and self-reported certainty 
for the yes votes and a significant positive correlation for the no votes. Corresponding with 
the results found by Chang et al. (2007), yes voters are more confident overall about their 
answer than no voters. Self-reported payment certainty surrounding the yes replies decreases 
as the bid price increases from 5 to 100 Euros, rises somewhat at 150 and 200 Euros and then 
drops again at 250 Euros.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Respondents are significantly more certain that they are willing to pay the lowest bid (€5) 
than the highest bid (€250) (Mann-Whitney Z=-4.886; p<0.001). No significant difference can 
be found between the payment certainty levels for respondents not wanting to pay the lowest 
and highest bid. The variation in payment certainty around the no responses is also less 
compared to the yes replies, ranging between 50 and 63 percent around a mean of 55 percent. 
Finally, payment certainty is significantly lower in France (average certainty is 71% for yes 
                                                                                                                                                        
between protest and non-protest bidders. Protest respondents are significantly higher educated and wealthier 
male respondents from slightly bigger households, with less trust and confidence in the description of the current 
situation and the feasibility of reaching the WFD objective of good ecological status for all water bodies in their 
region (test results are available from the author). 
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votes) compared to Belgium and the Netherlands (average certainty of yes votes is 
respectively 84 and 82%). No significant differences can be found between Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Mann-Whitney Z=-0.217; p<0.828 for the pooled yes and no responses).  
 
5. Estimated regression models 
Standard probit regression models were used (in Stata 10) to estimate mean WTP values (e.g. 
Cameron and James, 1987) and evaluate how different certainty calibration approaches affect 
these values. Two different types of models are estimated: a fixed effects probit model where 
self-reported payment certainty is included as a common explanatory factor and a random 
effects probit model where payment certainty is included as a separate stochastic error source 
to account for preference heterogeneity3. In the first model it is assumed that payment 
certainty affects WTP choices across all individuals in the same way, whereas in the second 
model the underlying assumption is that a significant share of preference heterogeneity is 
driven by groups of respondents with different WTP values separated from each other by 
payment certainty. Testing for random effects has the advantage that it explicitly shows the 
model variance associated with payment certainty. This can then be compared with the results 
from recoding WTP values based on different certainty cut-off points in the fixed effects 
probit model. The different factors that appeared to have a significant impact on stated WTP 
are presented in Table 1 (the calculated welfare estimates are presented in Table 2 in the next 
section).  
 
                                                 
3
 The model used here is a mixed binary probit model where random preference heterogeneity is picked up in the 
structure of the covariance matrix (Train, 2003) due to the expected clustering of responses across self-reported 
payment certainty levels (not to be confused with the panel data structure found in repeated choice experiments). 
A short model description is presented in Annex 2. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The estimated probit models in Table 1 are highly significant as shown by the outcome of the 
Wald tests. Individual coefficients are significant at the one percent level unless indicated 
otherwise. Two different fixed effects probit models are presented. The first model includes 
the original self-reported certainty levels as an explanatory factor and shows that certainty 
significantly affects stated WTP in a positive way: the higher (lower) respondent certainty, the 
higher (lower) the likelihood of agreeing to pay the bid price. As expected, bid price has a 
significant negative effect on stated WTP (the higher the price, the less likely someone is 
willing to pay). An interaction term is included between payment certainty and bid price to 
test if an effect exists of payment certainty variation on respondents’ WTP higher or lower bid 
prices4. The estimated coefficient indicates that there exists an additional negative price 
effect: respondents who are more certain are less likely to agree to pay a higher bid price than 
respondents who are less certain. 
 
In the second probit model, the variable ‘certainty’ is included as a dummy to test whether 
respondents who are completely certain are more willing to pay than respondents who are not 
completely certain. The dummy variable has the value one if respondents are 100% certain, so 
respondents who are completely certain are, ceteris paribus, more likely to pay than 
respondents who are not 100% certain. An interaction term is again included between the 
certainty dummy and bid price to test whether respondents who are completely certain also 
have a significantly different WTP value than respondents who are not completely certain. As 
in the first model, the interaction term has a significant downwards effect on mean WTP. 
                                                 
4
 In order to be able to compare the impact of the interaction term with that of the bid price, the original payment 
certainty classes were in this case recoded between 0 and 1. 
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The third model is the random effects probit model where the original payment certainty 
classes are included as a random variable to take into account possible variance due to the 
clustering of responses around stated payment certainty. This variance due to self-reported 
certainty is significant as reflected by the significance of the standard deviation of the random 
variable. Respondents answering the DC WTP question can be classified into more or less 
homogenous groups based on the certainty intervals. The correlation coefficient measuring 
the fraction of the total variance of the error terms explained by payment certainty (33%) is 
statistically significant based on the outcome of the Likelihood Ratio test (chi-square=173.86; 
p<0.001). The Ben-Akiva and Swait (1986) test for non-nested choice models is used to test 
the statistical significance of the improvement of model fit of the random effects model over 
the fixed effects model. The probability that the goodness of fit measure of the latter 
outperforms that of the former is virtually zero (p ≤ Φ(-171.187) ≈ 0 with Φ being the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function). These results hence show that stated 
payment certainty is responsible for a significant share of model error variance, and 
accounting for this error variance significantly improves the model fit. 
 
The other significant explanatory factors included in the regression models are a combination 
of theoretically expected and empirically driven factors. The former display the expected 
direction of influence and the coefficient estimates are more or less constant across the three 
models. The theoretically expected factors include household disposable income (the higher 
disposable income, the higher the probability of WTP), respondent attitude towards water 
quality improvements (measured through the importance attached to reaching good ecological 
water status; respondents who believe reaching good status is very important are more likely 
to pay), familiarity with the information provided in the questionnaire about current water 
quality (respondents who are more familiar with the information provided are more likely to 
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pay)5, and respondent belief in the valuation scenario (the more someone believes the 
scenario, the higher the likelihood of WTP)6.  
 
Ad hoc variables include the country dummy variables for Belgium and the Netherlands, 
which show that the estimated WTP functions are not the same (and hence not transferable) 
across the three countries making up the international river basin. The difference between the 
parameter estimates for Belgium and the Netherlands is not significant in any of the three 
models (based on the Wald test; test results are available from the author). This indicates that 
French river basin residents value the benefits from water quality improvements significantly 
different from residents in Belgium and the Netherlands (the latter are less likely to pay). 
Respondent age is the only significant demographic factor. No a priori expectations existed 
regarding its direction of influence. In this case, older respondents are more likely to say yes 
to the presented bid amount than younger respondents. Other demographic and socio-
economic characteristics have no significant impact on stated WTP. 
 
6. Accounting for payment certainty in welfare estimation 
Welfare estimates are presented in Table 2, including the uncorrected mean WTP based on the 
first fixed effects probit model in Table 1, mean WTP based on different certainty calibration 
cut-off points in the first fixed effects probit model, mean WTP for those respondents who are 
and those who are not 100% certain based on the second fixed effects probit model in Table 1, 
                                                 
5
 The dummy has the value 1 if respondents never heard of the information before. 
6
 This variable was measured on a 5-point semantic differential scale ranging from ‘completely not credible’ to 
‘completely credible’. Dummy variables were included for the two positive levels (somewhat and completely 
credible). No significant difference can be detected between the two dummy variables in any of the three models 
based on the Wald test (test results are available from the author). 
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and mean WTP derived from the random effects probit model presented in Table 1. The 95 
percent confidence intervals around estimated mean WTP are based on the delta method 
(Greene, 2003). A simple two-tailed t-test is used to test the statistical significance of the 
observed differences between the welfare estimates. The statistical efficiency of the welfare 
estimates is measured with the help of the mean squared error (MSE). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
A first important observation from Table 2 is that respondents who are 100% certain about 
their stated WTP are willing to pay, on average, significantly more than respondents who are 
not 100% certain (t = 3.888; p<0.001). The negative additional price effect found in the 
second probit model for respondents who are completely certain (see section 5) is offset by 
the fact that these respondents are more likely to pay overall than respondents who are not 
completely certain. Not accounting for payment uncertainty hence results in an overestimation 
of the welfare measure. The statistical efficiency of the welfare estimates is also highest for 
respondents who are 100% certain when examining the MSE values7. This implies that WTP 
values are most accurate when respondents are completely c rtain. 
 
A second observation is that, as the MSE show, the statistical inefficiency of the calibrated 
welfare estimates (i.e. recoding of uncertain WTP based on different certainty cut-off points) 
increases as the restrictions imposed on payment certainty are more stringent (and the welfare 
estimates decrease accordingly as expected). Hence, as demand for payment certainty of 
hypothetical WTP responses increases for welfare estimation purposes, the practice of 
recoding uncertain responses results in gradually less precise welfare estimates. 
                                                 
7
 Despite the lower number of observations underlying this estimate. 
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A third observation is that accounting for the different constant term across respondents with 
different payment certainty levels in the random effects model yields a significantly lower 
welfare measure compared to the uncorrected welfare estimation procedure (t = 2.440; 
p<0.015). In the latter case, the assumption is that the constant is the same across all 
respondents irrespective of respondent certainty. The more conservative welfare measure 
comes at the expense of estimation efficiency. In this particular case, also the variation 
coefficient of both welfare estimates were compared to double check the big difference in 
absolute MSE values8. Based on this alternative statistical efficiency measure, the difference 
is less dramatic. The variation coefficient of the welfare estimate derived from the random 
effect probit model (7.5%) is about 60 percent higher than the variation coefficient for the 
uncorrected welfare measure (4.6%), but still relatively low. 
 
Finally, comparing the lower random effect welfare estimate with the calibrated welfare 
estimates, it compares best with the estimate obtained when responses have to be at least 50% 
certain and are recoded otherwise (t = 0.653; p<0.515). The random effect welfare estimate is 
significantly higher than the welfare estimates calibrated upon a cut-off point of 60, 70 and 80 
percent. A remarkable finding is that the random effect mod l generates a welfare estimate, 
which is not very much different from the welfare estimate based on the uncertain (<100%) 
responses only (t = 0.124; p<0.901). An intuitive explanation for this finding is hard to give. 
The random effect model includes respondents who are completely certain and respondents 
who are not. The weighted average of both groups (respondents who are 100% certain and 
respondents who are not) is €103.6, which is (as expected) closer to the uncorrected mean 
WTP. 
 
                                                 
8
 The variation coefficient is equal to the standard error divided by mean WTP. 
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7. Underlying sources of payment uncertainty 
Respondents who were not 100% certain about their stated WTP were asked in an open-ended 
follow-up question why not. The reasons given were carefully analyzed and categorized, 
followed by the estimation of a formal econometric payment certainty model like the ones 
discussed in section 2. The main sources of uncertainty underlying stated WTP are presented 
in Table 3. Payment uncertainty can be related to imperfect knowledge and information about 
(i) the good to be valued (which is a function of information provision and experience), 
including its provision level now and in the future (referred to here as ‘supply uncertainty’), 
(ii) the utility derived from different ‘consumption’ levels (referred to here as ‘demand 
uncertainty’), which is a function of individual respondent characteristics such as household 
income levels and corresponding purchasing power (now and in the future as CV research 
often asks respondents to pay over a specified period of time in the future), (iii) particular 
simulated market conditions (referred to here as ‘survey instrument uncertainty’), such as 
respondent trust in property right security when paying for a public good, public good 
suppliers (e.g. government or other) and related payment mechanisms (e.g. tax or user fee), 
and (iv) price levels. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Almost half of all self-reported payment uncertainty (45%) is related to the survey instrument, 
followed by respondent uncertainty about his or her future income situation (mentioned by a 
fifth of the uncertain sample), and current and future price levels (17%). A high cost price can 
be seen as a choke price and hence as another demand related source of uncertainty. Within 
the category ‘survey instrument uncertainty’, three sub-groups are distinguished. Policy 
scenario uncertainty constitutes the largest source of uncertainty. This includes lack of trust 
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that the money paid will actually be spent on the improvement of water quality, lack of trust 
in the government and water managing institutions as the main providers of the good for 
which respondents were asked to pay, the perceived inefficiency of public administration and 
lack of control over how public money is spent. This category is closely related to and 
overlaps with the ‘supply’ related sources of uncertainty as it also refers to doubts about the 
provision of the environmental good in question. Another source of survey instrument 
uncertainty relates to the appropriateness of taxes as the payment mode or whether individual 
households are the right target group for this particular problem.  
 
Although it was emphasized in the questionnaire that the contingent market simulation is 
based on the polluter pays principle, fifteen percent of the uncertain respondents question 
whether this is actually the case, including how much surrounding countries will do to solve 
the problem and to what extent all households will pay for this. Together with the lack of trust 
in the government, these latter reasons are usually classified as protest response in CV. Protest 
beliefs may hence be an important source of payment uncertainty. On the other hand, 
respondents who are uncertain may also be more inclined to resort to protest beliefs when 
trying to explain why they are uncertain due to instable pref rences.  
 
Interesting differences were found when looking at the main sources of uncertainty across the 
three countries. In France, doubts about household income are the main source of uncertainty, 
and also in the Dutch sample most respondents are worried about their future employment 
status. These concerns are much less a source of uncertainty in Belgium where most 
respondents lack trust in the authorities and doubt that the money will actually be spent on the 
improvement of water quality. This reason comes second in the Netherlands, and plays almost 
no role in France. Also the feasibility of reaching a good ecologic water status plays an 
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important role in Belgium and the Netherlands, but much less in France. Uncertainty about 
whether the polluter will pay plays a stronger role in France than in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Related to this, a remarkable finding is that uncertainty about what surrounding 
countries will do is mentioned by almost 10 percent of all respondents in the Dutch 
(downstream) sample, less than one percent in Belgium and never in the French (upstream) 
sample. The high bid price is an important source of uncertainty in all three samples. 
 
Based on these identified sources of uncertainty, the observed variation in self-reported 
payment certainty was regressed on a combination of related explanatory factors in an ordered 
probit model9. The statistically best fit results for the pooled (yes and no) WTP responses are 
presented in Table 4 (only explanatory factors that were found to be significant at the ten 
percent level are included). Coefficient estimates are significant at the one percent level 
unless indicated otherwise. Besides the pooled model results, the results for the positive and 
negative WTP responses are also presented in Table 4. Including a dummy for the positive 
and negative DC WTP responses in the pooled model has a highly significant positive impact 
on self-reported payment certainty (i.e. respondents who were willing to pay were 
significantly more certain), but this variable is correlated with, for instance, the bid price and 
household income. To avoid multicolinearity, the results are presented in two separately 
estimated models. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
                                                 
9
 The payment certainty measurement scale is interpreted as an ordinal scale, justifying the use of an ordered 
probit model. This means that 100 percent is more certain than 50 percent, but 100 percent is not necessarily 
twice as certain as 50 percent. Nor is an increase in certainty from 50 to 60 percent the same as an increase in 
certainty from 90 to 100 percent. There are simply 11 categories with 10 percent being more certain than 0 
percent, 20 percent being more certain than 10 percent etc. 
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In order to test the sensitivity of the estimated model results to the number of cut-off points, 
different classifications were used. The pooled model presented in Table 4 yields the best 
model fit and is based on recoding of the original payment certainty categories in 4 classes: 
less than 50% certain, 50% certain, between 50 and 90% certain and 100% certain10.  
Contrary to respondents who were willing to pay the presented bid amount (yes voters), 
certainty levels for respondents who were not willing to pay (no voters) are not in any way 
affected by the supply related indicator (confidence in environmental good provision) and the 
level of the bid price. Respondent confidence in the feasibility of environmental good 
provision increases payment certainty underlying stated WTP except for those respondents 
who refused to pay. The non-linear price effect also applies only to the positive WTP 
responses. In general, the higher the bid amount respondents are asked to pay, the less certain 
they are about their WTP. The small, but statistically significant positive quadratic effect 
implies a U-shaped curve when plotting the predicted payment certainty against the bid price 
(e.g. Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998). That is, certainty is highest around the lowest and highest 
bids and lowest for intermediate bid levels where mean WTP is expected to be.  
 
As expected, knowledge has a significant impact on payment certainty irrespective of a 
respondent’s WTP reply (respondents who are not familiar with the information in the 
questionnaire are less certain about their WTP responses). The same applies to ability to pay 
as an important driving force behind WTP (the higher the income level, the more certain the 
respondent is about his WTP), and protest against the survey instrument (protesters are more 
                                                 
10
 The same explanatory factors are found to be statistically significant based on the original certainty categories 
and OLS regression based on these original categories, indicating that the estimated model is robust. The 
explanatory power of the estimated OLS models (adjusted R-square) is 35% for the yes responses and 37% for 
the no responses.  
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certain about their stated WTP)11. Whereas the effect size of knowledge is the same for both 
yes and no responses, it is two to three times higher for yes than no responses in the case of 
income and protest. 
 
Finally, other significant factors include respondent gender, age and country of residence. 
Women are less certain than men (based on yes responses only), and older respondents are 
less certain than younger respondents (irrespective of their WTP reply). Respondents from 
Belgium and the Netherlands are significantly more certain about their stated WTP than 
respondents from France, whilst accounting for a variety of other influencing factors. The 
differences between the parameter estimates for Belgium and the Netherlands are statistically 
significant except for the no responses, suggesting that social-cultural differences may have 
played a role between the samples12.  
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper’s main objective was to present the effect of an alternative payment certainty 
calibration method on welfare estimation based on hypothetical WTP, moving away from 
existing recoding procedures and taking full account of the self-reported measurement error 
caused by payment uncertainty in the stochastic error component of a mixed probit discrete 
choice model. The study confirms what other CV studies found before, that is, that 
respondents face considerable uncertainty when participating in a simulated hypothetical 
market, and this uncertainty significantly affects their stated WTP. Not accounting for 
                                                 
11
 Protest refers here to the underlying reason for payment certainty, not to the WTP question, hence the reason 
why the effect is significant for both yes and no responses. 
12
 The Wald chi-square equals 3.21 (p<0.073) for the pooled model, 5.21 (p<0.022) for the yes responses and 
0.08 (p<0.776) for the no responses. 
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payment uncertainty results in an overestimation of the welfare measure. Comparing 
respondents who are and respondents who are not completely certain about their stated WTP, 
the latter are significantly less willing to pay than the former and the estimated welfare 
measure is less precise. Preference heterogeneity in stated WTP due to payment certainty is 
significant and accounting for this heterogeneity in the mixed probit discrete choice model 
yields a significantly lower WTP estimate, comparable to the calibrated welfare estimate 
when responses have to be at least 50% certain. An important advantage of the mixed model 
over the recoding of uncertain responses in a common effect probit model is that it explicitly 
shows the model variance associated with payment certainty. Furthermore, accounting for the 
error variance caused by different levels of payment certainty in the mixed probit model 
significantly improved the model fit. 
 
Besides the application of an alternative certainty calibration model, also the mix of a 
structured qualitative analysis and econometric modeling of underlying sources of payment 
uncertainty is new in this study. Sources of payment uncertainty were related to imperfect 
knowledge and information about the environmental good involved, future supply levels, 
income constraints, price levels and the survey instrument. Together these sources of 
uncertainty were responsible for a third of the error variance in the estimated discrete choice 
model. The strong correlation between payment certainty and respondent familiarity with the 
public environmental good in question and belief in the presented valuation scenario points 
out the importance of the role of information in stated preference research.  
 
In conclusion, the results presented in this paper indicate that payment certainty is a 
significant random error component, but not a random process in itself. In-depth examination 
of the underlying sources of payment uncertainty provides important signals as to how to 
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improve stated preference survey formats and produce more reliable WTP values. Taking full 
advantage of the information provided by respondents about their experienced uncertainty and 
interpreting and modelling this information as an integral part of the welfare estimation 
procedure is considered a promising alternative payment certainty calibration procedure for 
future welfare estimation. More research is needed in different public environmental domains 
to find further empirical support for this approach. 
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Annex 1: WTP question and certainty follow-up questions 
 
 
Q. Are you as a household willing to pay every year € X in extra income tax over the next 10 years 
in order to reach a good ecological water quality status in 2015 in your part of the river basin?  
 
Note: this money will only be used to finance the additional measures needed to reach a good 
ecological water quality status in 2015 in your part of the river basin as indicated in the map. 
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
 
Q. Can you explain why you are willing to pay this specific amount of money, or if you are not 
willing to pay this specific amount of money why not? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Q. How certain are you that you will actually pay this specific amount of money, or if you are 
not willing to pay this specific amount of money how certain are you that you will not pay? 
 
(please circle the appropriate percentage) 
 
    0%           100% 
  certain  10%  20%  30%  40%   50%  60%   70%   80%   90%  certain 
 
 
 
 
 
Q. If you are not completely (100%) certain, can you explain why not?  
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Annex 2: The random effects probit model13 
The probit model is represented as a probabilistic choice model Pij=Prob(Vij + εij > B) 
consisting of observable explanatory factors V and a random component ε due to 
unobservable factors. Individual i will accept to pay the bid price B if utility associated with 
the environmental change is higher than the price that has to be paid. The standard indirect 
utility function Uij = Vij + εij can be rewritten as Uij = βjXij + εij where the measurable 
component of utility is measured through a vector of j utility coefficients β associated with a 
vector of individual characteristics Xij, and εij captures the unobserved influences on an 
individual’s choice. β is normally distributed in the population with mean b and covariance Ω: 
βj ~ N(b, Ω). The random effects probit model assumes that model coefficients vary randomly 
across individuals instead of being fixed. βj is in that case decomposed into its mean and 
deviations from its mean: Uij = bXij + jβ
~ Xij + εij where jβ
~
=b-βj. The last two terms in the 
utility function are random. Denoting jβ
~ Xij + εij = ηij, utility becomes Uij = bXij + ηij. The 
covariance of ηij now depends on both Xij and Ω, such that the covariance differs over 
individuals. 
 
                                                 
13
 Based on Hausman and Wise (1978) and Train (2003). 
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Table 1: WTP - probit regression results  
 Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
 
Factor 
 
 
Value range 
 βˆ  St err  βˆ  St err  βˆ  St err 
Constant -  -7.742 0.893  -7.534 0.862  -6.616 0.944 
Belgium 0-1  -0.352 0.114  0.115ns 0.106  -0.592 0.145 
Netherlands 0-1  -0.253a 0.125  0.196b 0.115  -0.491 0.154 
Bid price €5-250  -0.005 0.001  -0.007 0.001  -0.008 0.001 
Age 18-92 years  0.011 0.003  0.007 0.003  0.013 0.003 
Household income €9-54*103  0.641 0.085  0.723 0.082  0.628 0.090 
Importance 0-1  0.199a 0.084  0.181a 0.081  0.250 0.087 
Familiarity 0-1  -0.326 0.094  -0.384 0.089  -0.315 0.101 
Credibility (somewhat) 0-1  0.582 0.089  0.592 0.086  0.549 0.092 
Credibility (completely) 0-1  0.714 0.149  0.803 0.146  0.655 0.155 
Certainty 0-100%  0.020 0.002  0.564* 0.117    
Certainty*bid price €0-250  -0.004 0.002  -0.002a 0.001    
σcertainty          0.714 0.134 
ρcertainty         0.338 0.084 
           
Log likelihood   -641.043  -698.957  -625.466 
Wald chi-square   434.35  369.04  314.99 
McFadden R-square   0.318  0.257  0.335 
N   1378  1378  1378 
a
 p < 0.05; b p < 0.10; ns not significant (p > 0.10); * dummy where 1 is 100% certain, and 0 is less than 100% certain 
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Table 2: Mean WTP with certainty corrections 
 
  Fixed Effects Probit  RE Probit 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Summary statistics 
 
 
Uncorrected 
Certainty 
≥50% 
Certainty 
≥60% 
Certainty 
≥70% 
Certainty 
≥80% 
 100% 
certain 
<100% 
certain 
  
Mean WTP (€/year)  107.4 92.8 63.1 50.9 22.3  127.4 86.3  87.5 
95% confidence interval  97.6-117.2 83.1-102.6 52.9-73.3 40.5-61.2 10.1-34.6  113.3-141.6 71.8-100.8  74.7-100.3 
MSE1  0.201 0.202 0.211 0.218 0.238  0.168 0.218  0.662 
N  1662 1662 1662 1662 1662  701 961  1662 
1
 Mean squared error: 





−∑
=
n
i
ii WTPPTW
n 1
2)ˆ(1 where PTW ˆ is predicted WTP and WTP observed WTP 
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Table 3: Main sources of payment uncertainty 
 
Share (%) 
Uncertainty related to the good self and its future supply  
Feasibility reaching good ecological water status 7.2 
Insufficient information about the good and its supply 2.3 
Doubt effectiveness of measures to be taken 1.3 
Subtotal 10.8 
  
Future demand uncertainty  
Future household income 17.3 
Rising other household expenditures in future 2.4 
Future situation in general 1.8 
Subtotal 21.5 
  
Price uncertainty  
High cost price 13.6 
Future development cost price/tax 2.0 
Calculation cost price 1.8 
Subtotal 17.4 
  
Survey instrument uncertainty  
General survey instrument uncertainty  
Doubt own contribution to the problem 3.3 
Appropriateness of the tax instrument 2.8 
Doubt influence on political decision 2.1 
Existence other possible solutions 1.6 
Doubt whether households are the right target group 0.9 
Doubt whether paying extra is the solution to this problem 0.4 
Subtotal 11.1 
  
Policy scenario uncertainty  
Disbelief that the money will be spent on water quality improvements 13.0 
Mistrust of the government 4.9 
Control over how money will be spent and monitoring results 1.0 
Subtotal 18.9 
  
Uncertainty market conditions  
Whether polluters will pay 9.5 
Whether everybody else will pay too 3.3 
What surrounding countries will do 2.1 
Subtotal 14.9 
  
Other reasons 5.4 
  
Total 100.0 
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Table 4: Payment certainty - ordered probit regression results 
   Pooled model  Yes responses only  No responses only 
Factor Value range  βˆ  St err  βˆ  St err  βˆ  St err 
Imperfect knowledge/information          
Familiarity 0-1  -0.371 0.072  -0.355 0.108  -0.351 0.108 
Supply related           
Credibility (completely) 0-1  0.291 0.101  0.224b 0.128  0.162ns 0.194 
Demand related           
Household income  €9-54*103  0.500 0.065  0.532 0.096  0.172b 0.101 
Price related           
Bid price €5-250  -0.011 0.001  -0.008 0.002  -0.001ns 0.002 
Bid price squared €25-62500  0.337*10-4 0.569*10-5  0.243*10-4 0.882*10-5  0.955*10-5 ns 0.881*10-5 
Survey instrument related          
Protest 0-1  0.978 0.069  1.449 0.095  0.793 0.118 
Other respondent characteristics          
Gender 0-1  -0.136a 0.067  -0.269 0.093  -0.023ns 0.104 
Age 18-92 years  -0.006 0.002  -0.008 0.003  -0.010 0.003 
Belgium 0-1  1.082 0.083  0.474 0.114  2.181 0.164 
Netherlands 0-1  0.952 0.090  0.248a 0.122  2.149 0.176 
           
Log likelihood   -1586.432  -749.430  -655.920 
Likelihood ratio chi-square  546.46  355.78  310.48 
McFadden R-square   0.147  0.192  0.191 
N   1434  812  622 
a
 p < 0.05; b p < 0.10; ns not significant (p > 0.10)
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Figure 1: Probability distribution function yes votes and payment certainty yes and no votes 
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